Salam readers!
In today’s first part of the trilogy analyzing trinity, we will discuss the logical problem of the trinity, its historical roots, and answer some objections.
Introduction:
Christians, muslims, and jews, all believe in God. The idea of a necessary, eternal, all powerful all knowing creator who created the universe and everything in it, and is in full control of everything, unites members of all three faiths. However, though we hold to this obvious truth, we completely disagree on the concept of God.
Muslims, and jews, say that God is absolutely 1, with no partners, who is all sublime and in full control of the universe. However, Christians hold to a concept of God known as the trinity. In this series, we will define the trinity, and analyze it from three different angles, being logical, philosophical, and scriptural. Let’s begin!
What is trinity?
The doctrine of the trinity posits that the 1 God exists in 3 persons, being the father, the son, and the holy spirit. They are co-equal, co-eternal, independent, and co-substancial. No person is more God than the other, and no person possesses any attributes that aren’t shared by the others. All 3 persons share a divine essense, or nature, which is fully possessed by them.
What is the LPT:
The logical problem of the trinity, or LPT, is an argument presented to show that the doctrine of the trinity makes no sense in the way which it is posited.
The argument, in its simpler form, is this.
The following 7 premisses are accepted by all trinitarians.
1. The father is God.
2. The son is God.
3. The holy spirit is God.
4. The father is not the son.
5. The son is not the spirit.
6. The spirit is not the father.
7. They are all 1 God.
The argument is following from these 6 premisses, and using the normal method of counting, that the trinity is 3 Gods. However, since the trinity posits that there is 1 God, the trinity makes no sense from a logical perspective.
The advanced LPT:
What you have just read is only a simple argument using the LPT. However, there is a more advanced argument which is not refutable.
The argument is this.
Every human being is an instantiation of 1 essense, being the human nature. Take Peeter, James, and John, for example. Peeter, james, and John are 3 instantiations of the human essense, or nature. They are each fully human and the human nature is 100 percent possessed by all three, Peeter James and John. However, we would not say that there is only 1 human, rather we would say that there are 3. Therefore, if Peeter, James, and John, who are each instantiations of 1 human essense, or nature, are considered 3 humans, we should apply this same logic to the persons of the trinity, and conclude that there are 3 Gods.
The only way a Christian would circumvent this dilemma is by saying 1 of the 2 options.
1. The trinity is three Gods.
2. Peeter, James, and John are only 1 human being.
There is no third option.
Does this argument have historical roots?
Christians, when reading this article, might simply say that the LPT was not a problem for the early trinitarian Christians, and that it was a new invention concocted by muslims and skeptics. However, a particular early church father attests to the complete opposite.
On not 3 Gods:
Gregory of nisa, a fourth century church father and philosopher, wrote a letter called on not 3 Gods, also known as letter to Oblabius. In this letter, Gregory attempts to refute the LPT, and we’ll see how.
Background:
Oblabius, the recipient of Gregory’s letter, wrote a letter to him asking for help with this exact question. Gregory in his letter, on not 3 Gods, will respond to Oblabius’s inquiry.
Gregory says:
"the question you propound to us is no small one, nor such that but small harm will follow if it meets with insufficient treatment. For by the force of the question, we are at first sight compelled to accept one or other of two erroneous opinions, and either to say “there are three Gods,” which is unlawful, or not to acknowledge the Godhead of the Son and the Holy Spirit, which is impious and absurd."
Note that Gregory never reprimands Oblabius for such a question. he also concedes that the question is no small question, and that it could cause harm if if not delt with correctly.
He says:
We say, then, to begin with, that the practice of calling those who are not divided in nature by the very name of their common nature in the plural, and saying they are “many men,” is a customary abuse of language, and that it would be much the same thing to say they are “many human natures.” And the truth of this we may see from the following instance. When we address any one, we do not call him by the name of his nature, in order that no confusion may result from the community of the name, as would happen if every one of those who hear it were to think that he himself was the person addressed, because the call is made not by the proper appellation but by the common name of their nature: but we separate him from the multitude by using that name which belongs to him as his own — that, I mean, which signifies the particular subject. Thus there are many who have shared in the nature — many disciples, say, or apostles, or martyrs— but the man in them all is one; since, as has been said, the term “man” does not belong to the nature of the individual as such, but to that which is common. For Luke is a man, or Stephen is a man; but it does not follow that if any one is a man he is therefore Luke or Stephen: but the idea of the persons admits of that separation which is made by the peculiar attributes considered in each severally, and when they are combined is presented to us by means of number; yet their nature is one, at union in itself, and an absolutely indivisible unit, not capable of increase by addition or of diminution by subtraction, but in its essence being and continually remaining one, inseparable even though it appear in plurality, continuous, complete, and not divided with the individuals who participate in it. And as we speak of a people, or a mob, or an army, or an assembly in the singular in every case, while each of these is conceived as being in plurality, so according to the more accurate expression, “man” would be said to be one, even though those who are exhibited to us in the same nature make up a plurality. Thus it would be much better to correct our erroneous habit, so as no longer to extend to a plurality the name of the nature, than by our bondage to habit to transfer to our statements concerning God the error which exists in the above case.
Gregory states that people are called by their name to signify them from others. However, the same happens with the father, son, and holy spirit. Their distinctness makes it so that they perform different tasks and hence are called on for different things.
Gregory also states that all those who share the same human nature are 1, since they are man and man is 1.
This indirectly concedes that Peeter, James, and John are 1 human being.
Gregory also gives the example of a people, a mob, and an army to state that something can be singular and plural. However this makes no sense and results in partialism.
You wouldn’t say that there is 1 human being in an army or a group, you would say that many make up a group. In applying this to God, it would follow that the 3 persons make up God, and hence would be partialism.
The general, captain, private, etc are all part of the army and are not the entire army, hence partialism.
We can see that Gregory even had a hard time with this issue, and that the problem existed at that time.
Answering objections:
Objection: Human logic doesn’t apply to God. God exists outside of human logic and rationality, so why are you putting your own logical constraints on God because you can’t understand him? You and I both know we don’t know everything about God, so why is this a problem for the trinity?
Answer: This is the main objection to the LPT, and it is rather easy to answer. The first thing to note here is that we do not in fact know everything about God. We are not aware of his modality, which is how he performs certain actions, like creating the universe, hearing and seeing all, etc. However, the trinity has nothing to do with that. The trinity has to do with who God is, his identity.
this leads me to my next point. As people who believe in a creator, we don’t believe our logic and rationality came from nowhere. We believe, like you, that they were given to us by God almighty when he created us. That being said, it would be downright deceiving and unjust for God, the all just, Dute. 32:4, to give us logical faculties, reveal himself in a way which contradicts them, then expect worship.
Objection: The LPt is committing a catigory error falacy. God is distinguished by the atributes which he possesses, such as his omniscience, omnipotence, etc. Humans are distinguished by their minds, hence we can count Peeter James and John as 3 but the trinity as 1.
Answer: The LPt is not committing a catigory error. The objection poses no enharrant simitry breaker between the 2 examples of Peeter, James, and John, and father, son, and holy spirit which would logically justify them being counted differently. Humans also have atributes which their human nature gives them, such as the ability to die, the ability to sin, finiteness, being limited, ignorant, etc.
Conclusion and the Islamic perspective:
In Islam, our concept of god is easy to understand, and is perfectly in line with our God-given logic and rationality. The merciful, just, and loving creator made it so that little children, and those on remote islands, can still understand who he is without having access to a bible or quran. The main foundation, the concept of God in Islam can be perceived and understood by people of all ages, times, and circumstances, and this is not the case for the trinity.
Accept Islam, the only true religion of God!
Analyzing trinity PT. 1. Logical, updated
—
by
Leave a Reply